TLDR;
Jensen Huang’s departure from Nvidia’s board and chief executive role highlights how a company’s ownership structure can determine whether founders remain in control. Nvidia went public before dual-class shares became common, leaving Huang with only the voting power attached to his 3.6% stake. By contrast, later technology founders such as Larry Page, Sergey Brin and Mark Zuckerberg retained much greater control through shares with extra votes. The video also examines the spread of founder-control structures and explains how Nvidia’s growth and Huang’s influence kept investors and directors aligned for years.
- Dual-class shares give some shareholders more votes per share, helping founders retain control after an IPO.
- Huang’s 3.6% voting stake gave him far less protection than founders with super-voting shares.
- Nvidia’s success and Huang’s authority meant investors and directors had little reason to challenge his leadership—until circumstances changed.
How Google’s founders secured control after its IPO [0:37]
When Google prepared to go public in 2004, co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin asked to retain extraordinary control of the company. They received dual-class shares that gave them ten votes for each share, and they still control 53% of Google’s voting power, despite stepping away from day-to-day roles seven years before the events described. That control lets them influence board appointments, changes to the company’s charter and succession plans. Brin’s return to work on Google’s AI models in 2023 was therefore unlikely to require permission from other shareholders.
How dual-class shares protect technology founders [1:38]
Other technology companies, including Meta, Snap and SpaceX, adopted founder-control structures. Meta established its dual-class system in 2009, before its 2012 IPO, apparently following a suggestion from Napster co-founder and former Facebook president Sean Parker. Mark Zuckerberg owns 99% of Meta’s high-vote Class B shares and holds 61% of the company’s overall voting power, making it extremely difficult for other shareholders to remove him. Facebook co-founder Dustin Moskovitz said shareholders could not unite to vote against Zuckerberg, while Zuckerberg argued that founder control allows a company to make ambitious long-term bets.
Anthropic’s voting structure and the rise of founder control [2:41]
Anthropic’s IPO filing describes a structure that would give its seven co-founders 50.1% of voting power through a single voting share held by an LLC. Unlike control at Meta and Alphabet, which depends on founders retaining enough super-voting stock, Anthropic’s voting majority would not decrease as the founders sell or give away their equity. Each co-founder has pledged to donate 80% of their equity. The wider trend is growing: nearly half of US technology companies that went public in the previous year had dual-class shares, compared with only 5% in 2004, according to data compiled by University of Florida finance professor Jay Ritter.
Why Jensen Huang lacked the voting power of newer tech founders [3:29]
Nvidia went public in 1999, before dual-class shares became standard among Silicon Valley IPOs, leaving Huang without a special voting structure. Jeff Bezos similarly has no super-voting shares at Amazon, which went public in 1997, and Bill Gates had none when Microsoft listed in 1986. After leaving Nvidia’s board and CEO role, Huang retained a 3.6% equity stake, valued at about $145 billion—down from more than $200 billion in early October before the scandal—and only 3.6% of the votes. BlackRock and Vanguard each control roughly twice as many votes as Huang. Forbes estimated that a conventional ten-votes-per-share structure would have given him about 26% voting power, providing more influence in board discussions but not an unassailable majority.
Nvidia’s growth kept investors and directors aligned with Huang [4:47]
For years, Huang did not need extra voting rights: his operational authority and Nvidia’s extraordinary growth kept the board and shareholders aligned with him. UBS managing director Jason Katz described the reluctance to challenge a highly successful leader: “If you have a superstar, you don’t want to poke the bear.” Investors largely accepted Huang’s management style, including his 60 direct reports and the absence of a succession plan. The board was also regarded as loyal to him after more than three decades in charge. Board members had discussed succession planning, but Huang opposed the idea and no plan was established, according to The New York Times.